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The movements of original sound and historical performance practice
have altered the way we perceive the music of Bach and other composers
of the Baroque era; in fact these movements functioned as an antidote to
measuring the respective works against a system of aesthetic norms which
were not theirs. The foundation of these approaches lay not only in ac-
curate context reconstruction as to conventions and patterns of encoding
musical ideas into scores and the specific norms governing the translation
of musical scores into sound, but also in minute local history which un-
covered the details of what – sometimes quite mediocre – material was at
the disposition of the creative genius of the composer.
There can be no doubt that in the case of Kant, his philosophy has
often been pulled towards contemporary debates in philosophy, just
like Bach’s music had been performed in agreement with the norms of
the Classic-Romantic era for many years.
In what follows I shall try to attempt something like a reading of as-
pects of Kant’s transcendental idealism (“TI”) in a way comparable to an
original sound performance of Bach. Needless to say, what I can attempt
in such a small space is just a very rough sketch and not more than some-
thing like an outline of how such a type of reading might work. TI can be
approached in various ways, one of which is the distinction of and the
relationship between things in themselves and appearances, and I shall
focus on just a few issues of this vast problem.
The context relevant for our purposes is the specific condition, or if
you will the philosophical climate, at Kçnigsberg University, more specif-
ically the strength of Aristotelianism there, as the research summarized in
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the overviews of Tommasi1 and Darge2 has uncovered. More specifically,
what occurred at the Albertina was a meeting of two strands of Aristote-
lianism, i. e. the Aristotelianism of the Scholastic, in particular Scotist tra-
dition transmitted via Francisco Surez through Abraham Calov on the
one hand and the Renaissance, in particular Paduan Aristotelianism of
Jacopo Zabarella through Johann Heinrich Alsted and Paul Rabe on
the other hand. This context-reconstruction has painstakingly been car-
ried out by Kant scholars in the tradition of Giorgio Tonelli and Norbert
Hinske as well as by medievalists and historians of early modern philos-
ophy in the tradition of Etienne Gilson. Strikingly, the emphasis among
the Kant scholars is on Quellengeschichte, that of the medievalists and
early modern historians of philosophy more on Problemgeschichte.
I am not intending to provide another piece of Quellengeschichte here,
but rather, taking these contexts as having been established, I will turn to
Problemgeschichte and take up a claim made by Ludger Honnefelder,3 ac-
cording to which Kant’s conception of TI must be taken as both being
indebted to and altering a strategy deeply embedded in the Scotist-Sure-
zian-Calovian tradition of Aristotelianism. The paper is divided into 3
parts: First, I shall briefly discuss recent developments in the two-aspect
reading of TI, in particular the attempt to interpret Kant along the lines
of an analogy to secondary qualities in order to come to terms with pas-
sages in which Kant identifies appearances as representations which are in
us. These passages have prompted quite a number of commentators to
read Kant along phenomenalist lines, which however is most implausible
and which recourse to the secondary quality analogy intends to avoid. I
will then turn to the famous “Anmerkung II” of the Prolegomena and ex-
tract a seemingly inconsistent set of propositions about entities being on
the one hand external to the mind and on the other hand being nonethe-
less representations. In a first step to show that the inconsistency is merely
apparent, I shall suggest reading Kant in the tradition of Surez’s formal/
objective distinction, originally designed for concepts, with regard to rep-
1 Tommasi, Francesco Valerio: Philosophia transcendentalis. La questione antepredi-
cativa e l’analogia tra la Scolastica e Kant. Firenze 2008, 2–5.
2 Darge, Rolf: Surez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung und die Metaphysiktradition.
Leiden – Boston 2004, 4–27.
3 Honnefelder, Ludger: Duns Scotus. Munich 2005, 140–142. See also Id.: “Meta-
physics as a Discipline: From the ‘Transcendental Philosophy of the Ancients’ to
Kant’s Notion of Transcendental Philosophy.” In: The Medieval Heritage in Early
Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory 1400–1700. Eds. Russell Friedman and
Lauge O. Nielsen. Dordrecht 2004, 53–74.
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resentations in general. As a second step I will try to indicate that we
should read Kant here as subscribing to the Scotist idea according to
which the fundamental question of metaphysics, i. e. , the question
about being as being or being as such is to be understood in terms of pos-
sibilia and that these possibilia require a cognitive system relative to which
they can be accounted for as to their ontological status. Finally, the con-
sequences of this approach with regard to the assessment of Kant’s posi-
tion concerning the subject-dependency of certain properties will be dis-
cussed briefly.
II
There can be no doubt that there has been something like a paradigm
shift in the interpretation of TI. In the wake of the writings of Prauss
and Allison, the so-called two-aspect view is now clearly dominant and
considered to be both correct as an interpretation of what Kant had in
mind and to be most attractive from a systematic point of view. There
are, however, at least two principal variants of this view, as Rosefeldt4
has pointed out. According to a methodological reading the distinction
between things in themselves and appearances is merely a matter of con-
sidering one and the same entity from different perspectives or different
standpoints. The metaphysical or ontological variant, in contrast, regards
an appearance and a thing in itself to form a composite whole; converse-
ly, such a composite whole is to be analyzed in terms of two heterogene-
ous components, which we can call the appearance-component and the
in-itself-component. Put metaphorically, these two components are in a
sense different strata or slices of one and the same entity, and when calling
this entity an appearance we speak in a rhetorical manner, using the fig-
ure of metonymy or pars-pro-toto. As to the spelling out of the two com-
ponents, there have been a number of suggestions recently. Rae Langton5
construes these two components in terms of the intrinsic and extrinsic
properties of a thing. Allais,6 Collins7 and Rosefeldt8 take it to be ac-
4 Rosefeldt, Tobias: “Dinge an sich und sekundre Qualitten.” In: Kant in der Ge-
genwart. Ed. Jìrgen Stolzenberg. Berlin – New York 2007, 167–209, in part.
171–175.
5 Langton, Rae: Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves. Oxford
1998.
6 Allais, Lucy: “Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy.” In: Journal of
the History of Philosophy 45, 2007, 359–384.
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countable in terms of properties which are mind-dependent or subject-re-
lativized and those which are not.
Evidently, there are some problems with this view, in particular if we
take it to be an interpretation of Kant, and I shall mention just a few of
them: a) It must be incomplete, because it cannot deal with those passag-
es which suggest that things in themselves and appearances are separate
entities and precisely not just components of a composite whole. b) It
is by no means certain as to whether there is really room for such a com-
posite whole in Kant’s account in the first place. I think, however, that
both problems can ultimately be solved, namely problem a) by showing
that the metaphysical variant of the two-aspect reading is itself just one
aspect of Kant’s distinction and needs to be supplemented by an account
of divine cognition and of the respective strata of the composite whole
which are its main object. As far as problem b) is concerned, I take it
that there is not just room for a composite whole, but that it is indispens-
able in the Kantian framework, in that the in-itself-component has to do
with the (ultimate) substratum, i. e. bearer of all properties an object has,
including those making up the appearance component. A complete an-
swer to b) therefore requires a comprehensive account of Kant’s theory
of substance, which – needless to say – I cannot provide here. Suffice
it to mention that it is a complex theory within which not only different
types of substances (or degrees of substantiality) need to be distinguished,
but within which there is even a hierarchy of substances. Moreover, for
Kant, the only substances of which we can have knowledge are substances
which are not substances in the highest sense possible.
What I should like to look at in more detail now are those efforts
within a metaphysical variant of a two-aspect reading, which try to ac-
count for the appearance component in terms of “mind-dependent” or
“subject-relativized” properties, drawing on an important passage in the
Prolegomena, which seems to support such a reading and which seems
to endorse the analogy to secondary qualities in this respect. Rae Langton
integrated her reading of the secondary quality analogy into her account
of the two components of the composite whole in terms of extrinsic and
intrinsic properties. She distinguishes two senses of “primary/secondary”:
Taken in one sense, this reading simply coincides with the intrinsic/ex-
trinsic-distinction; in a second sense, however, it coincides with the dis-
7 Collins, Arthur W.: Possible Experience. Understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason. Berkeley – Los Angeles – London 1999.
8 Rosefeldt: “Dinge an sich und sekundre Qualitten.”
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tinction between the scientific and the manifest image of the world, made
prominent by, above all, W. Sellars.9 Kant’s point, according to Langton,
is that all properties of appearances are secondary in the first sense of the
distinction and, as far as the second distinction is concerned, appearances
really have the properties which science ascribes to them. Langton then
focuses on the primary qualities in the second sense and does not put
much emphasis on which theory of secondary qualities in the second
sense Kant actually subscribed to. The formulations apparently indicating
idealism she tries to deal with in terms of an account of the possible spi-
ritual nature of things in themselves and Kant’s theory of space and time.
In her opinion, it is the dynamic properties which correspond to the for-
mal features of space and time.
For Collins10 and Allais11 the secondary quality analogy is supposed
to show the mind-dependency even of the primary qualities like exten-
sion. According to this reading, certain objects have the property of ap-
pearing spatio-temporal to creatures with a cognitive apparatus like
ours. There is nothing deceptive in this, according to this line of thought,
just as colours are not due to a deception. Kant’s philosophy thus stresses
subjectivity in the sense of mind-dependency, as Collins puts it. These
properties, moreover, are in a sense primitive, i. e. cannot be analyzed
any further: some objects just appear extended for creatures like us.
For Allais, the secondary quality analogy works only on the assumption
that Kant is taking these subject-relativized properties to be properties
of extra-mental entities and this involves reading Kant’s explicit rejection
of this analogy in KrV A 29/B 45 against the background of the different
secondary quality theory of the first Critique, according to which secon-
dary qualities are mental states.
Rosefeldt12 expands upon Allais’s account in two respects : i) he does
not treat these subject-relativized properties, as he calls them, as primitive,
but analyzes them by means of a functional account of dispositions which
very elegantly allows him to account for the in-itself-component (at least
partly) of the composite whole as well. ii) connected to this, this disposi-
tional account allows him to avoid the assumption that Kant changed his
theory in this respect; rather his account, Rosefeldt says, can explain why
Kant seems to switch between the two.
9 Langton: Kantian Humility, 156.
10 Collins: Possible Experience, 8–19.
11 Allais: “Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary Quality Analogy”, 476–478.
12 Rosefeldt: “Dinge an sich und sekundre Qualitten”, 184–189.
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For Rosefeldt, colours are dispositional properties of extra-mental en-
tities in a very special sense, i. e. in that a colour is the property to have a
property F that causes colour impressions in human beings. Similarly, spa-
tial properties are dispositional properties of extramental entities, i. e. the
property of having a property F which make us have spatial intuitions of
them. In both cases the dispositional property is subject-relativized, but
the property which, as it were, implements the respective functional
role is not, and hence belongs to the in-itself component of the composite
whole.
With this short sketch of recent trends regarding this feature of TI in
place, I should now like to turn to the pertinent Prolegomena passage itself
and then develop the outlines of a problemgeschichtliche or ‘original sound’
reading.
III
Anmerkung II (Prol, AA 04: 288–300) is the second of three of those
Anmerkungen which follow the enquiries concerning the first part of
the transcendental main question; i. e. how is mathematics possible?
The rather short passage consists of four paragraphs. In the first para-
graph, Kant is summing up his doctrine that objects are given to us
only in sensible intuition and insofar as they are appearances of things
in themselves. He then formulates a consequence of this doctrine
which he puts in quotation marks: hence, he says, “‘alle Kçrper mit
sammt dem Raume, darin sie sich befinden, fìr nichts als bloße Vorstel-
lungen in uns gehalten werden und existieren nirgend anders, als blos in
unsern Gedanken’” (Prol, AA 04: 288.30–32). Asking, in clear reference
to the Feder-Garve-review, whether this amounts to “obvious idealism” he
provides a vital definition of this position in the second paragraph. “Ide-
alism”, for Kant, is the doctrine according to which only thinking beings
exist whereas all other things are just representations in these thinking be-
ings, to which no external object corresponds. Kant then contrasts ideal-
ism, construed in this manner, with his own position and he emphasizes
that in his approach there is an external object corresponding to the rep-
resentations. More precisely, he claims that in his account there are exter-
nal bodies. These things are completely unknown to us as to what they
are in themselves; rather we know them through the representations
they effect in us, and these things are what we call “Kçrper” (Prol, AA
04: 289.11).
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The third paragraph expands upon this notion of the corresponding
external object of the representations and then draws the comparison to
the Lockean position, presumably in order to show that there is nothing
entirely new in principle with his approach. In fact, for him the idea
which has been maintained, as he stresses, “schon lange vor Lockes Zei-
ten” (Prol, AA 04: 289.18–19), is that certain properties have no exist-
ence external to our representations and he lists some of the well-known
secondary qualities. The difference to his position, he maintains, is that
he wishes also to treat the primary qualities, i. e. all those properties
which make up the intuition of a body, as belonging to its appearance
only. Just as a supporter of the theory that secondary qualities have no
existence outside our representations cannot be considered an idealist
solely by virtue of this view on properties, his theory, he says, cannot be
considered idealist either because the existence of the thing which appears
is not “aufgehoben” (Prol, AA 04: 289.33). All he claims is that we can-
not know how it is in itself.
In the fourth paragraph, Kant asks what he should say (in the view of
his critics) in order not to qualify as an idealist in the sense indicated in
the definition of the term provided by him above. He suggests two alter-
natives: a) The representation of space is adequate to the relationship of
our sensibility to the object, b) this representation must be completely
similar to the object. Kant endorses a) as his position (and as sufficient
to qualify as a non-idealist), but rejects b) as unintelligible. Most interest-
ingly though, he refers the reason to reject b) back to the secondary qual-
ity issue: the “cinnabar” (“Zinnober”, Prol, AA 04: 290.5) which triggers
the sensation of red does not have a similarity to this sensation. Now the
question is what the tertium comparationis of this account of secondary
qualities and TI in general is in this case. To answer this question, we
can extract at least the following six claims from Anmerkung II:
1) Bodies are nothing but representations and they exist only in thought.
2) Although they exist only in thought, there is a corresponding mind-
external object.
3) What corresponds is the body, of which how and what it is in itself
we do not know anything.
4) The body and the thing in itself form a composite whole.
5) The primary qualities belong to the body, i. e. the external object.
6) We know the body through our representations, but we do not know
the thing as it is in itself.
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Plainly, these six claims seem to form an inconsistent set and what we
have here is in a sense a microscopic equivalent of the macrocosm of
Kant’s account as a whole, namely apparently two thoughts which pull
in opposite directions, a situation which has prompted Gardner13 to con-
strue something like a ‘Kopenhagen interpretation’ of the distinction be-
tween things in themselves and appearances. If the body really exists only
in thought or as representation, it seems that the thing in itself must be a
separate entity. But this clashes with Kant’s explicit endorsement of a
metaphysical two-aspect view in paragraph 2 of Anmerkung II. More-
over, this inconsistency cannot be repaired by claiming that Kant is
using two different versions of the distinction between things in them-
selves and appearances, i. e. its empirical and its transcendental version,
because he clearly has the transcendental version in mind when he says
that objects exist only in thought and also when he insinuates that the
in-itself-component and the body constitute a composite whole.
As a way out of this inconsistency I suggest reading Kant along the
lines of a distinction originally designed for concepts and developed by
Francisco Surez, viz: there is a distinction between the concept taken
in a formal sense and the concept taken in an objective sense,14 and as
Marco Sgarbi15 has shown, this distinction was explicitly endorsed by
Calov.16 According to this distinction, the concept taken in the formal
sense is the act and the manner of conceiving an object, whereas the con-
cept in the objective sense is, or at any rate can be, the mind-external ob-
ject itself. This distinction has been applied to items other than concepts,
such as ideas, and this indicates that it was deemed to be rather flexible.
Now, if we read Kant in such a way as to assume that he expands this
distinction to representations in general, i. e. , encompassing both intu-
itions and concepts, it is clear that this distinction is offering a way out
of the problem regarding the apparent inconsistency of the six proposi-
tions put forward in Anmerkung II: Something can be a representation
and still be a mind-external object, insofar as it is a representation in
13 Gardner, Sebastian: Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. London 1999, 295–
298.
14 Suarez, Francisco: Disputationes Metaphysicae. Hildesheim – Zìrich – New York
1998 (= 2nd reprint of Francisci Suarez Opera omnia. Editio nova. C. Berton
(Ed.). Tom. 25. Paris 1866), II.1.1.
15 Sgarbi, Marco: Logica e metafisica nel Kant precritico. L’ambiente intellettuale di
Kçnigsberg e la formazione della filosofia kantiana. Frankfurt a.M. 2012, 82.
16 For example in his Stoicheiosis gnostologike vel Gnostologia. Scripta Philosophica.
Wittenberg 1673, 11–13.
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the objective sense of the term. If we take representation in the formal
sense of the term, however, we are clearly concerned with mental entities
or something mental. Passages in which Kant claims that something is
nothing outside our representations therefore need not be taken to
mean that we are concerned with mental entities.
The obvious question is now, of course, what this all means with re-
spect to the secondary quality analogy? Kant’s emphasis is clearly on pri-
maria, like secondary qualities, being essentially concerned with appear-
ances. Obviously, secondary qualities are first and foremost representa-
tions in the formal sense, and it remains to be seen to what extent and
in what manner they uncover an objective feature of objects. This indi-
cates that the point of the secondary quality analogy, and along with it
the notion of subject-relativity and mind-dependency, may be altogether
different when considered from a problem-historical perspective. I shall
come to this in a moment. Before that, however, I should like to mention
a difficulty about this distinction that has not gone unnoticed even long
before Kant’s own time: in Surez’s distinction the concept or, more
broadly, the representation in the objective sense is not really a concept
but an entity.
As Sven Knebel17 has shown, Leibniz challenged the view that the re-
lation of being an object of cognition (“Erkenntnisbeziehung”) is extrin-
sic to the object and he rather considered it to be intrinsic or essential.
Maybe this is not as surprising as it seems at first view, when we trace
this problem even further back to Scotus, Surez’s own point of depar-
ture, and his account of being in terms of possibilia, or his modal expli-
cation of being in Ord. I d43 q. un, n7:18 For Scotus, as Honnefelder19
has elucidated, both an intrinsic and an extrinsic factor are needed and
this sense essential to account for the ontological status of the realiter pos-
sible: although these possibilia ‘exist’ in their own right and from their
causes prior to a cognizing subject, they need a cognitive system which
can know them as a kind of realm for their being. This Scotist strategy,
in my opinion, may very well also lie at the heart of Calov’s conception of
17 Knebel, Sven K.: “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Denomination: What makes Leibniz’s
departure from the schoolmen so bewildering?”. In: VII. Internationaler Leibniz-
Kongreß: Nihil sine ratione. Mensch, Natur und Technik im Wirken von G.W. Leib-
niz. Ed. Hans Poser. Hannover 2001, 615–619.
18 The reference is to Ioannis Duns Scoti Ordinatio. Opera omnia. Studia et cura
Commissionis Scotisticae ad fidem codicum edita. Tom 6. Civitas Vaticana
1963, 354.
19 Honnefelder: Duns Scotus, 81.
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the science of gnostology which deals with the knowable insofar as it is
knowable.20 Moreover, at least for Scotus, the cognitive system in ques-
tion is the divine mind.
In this vein, and following the thought developed by Honnefelder,21
we can read Kant as putting the emphasis on formal with regard to “in
us” or “human” and on objective with regard to “representation” when
claiming that these “Kçrper” are nothing but representations in us (Prol,
AA 04: 288.31) or that bodies are just a kind of human representations
(KrV, A 370; cf. also KrV, A 490–491/B 518–519); because for Kant,
taken this way, it is clear that an entity must be knowable by a cognitive
subject in order to fully account for its real possibility. Thus, the position
Kant wishes to avoid is taking “divine” representation as the default cog-
nitive system in respect of which real possibility (or being) needs to be
accounted for. To be sure, I do not think that in Kant’s thought the re-
placement of the divine through the human cognitive system is total;
rather the divine cognitive system, albeit of course in a qualified manner,
retains this function as far as things in themselves are concerned. At any
rate, as I will try to show elsewhere, a recourse to the peculiar nature of
the divine cognitive system not only allows us to account for the in-itself-
component of the composite whole, but also to honour those passages
which suggest two worlds of separate entities.
Read this way we have here an expression of Kant’s strong, if you will
metaphysical notion of equality, in that the human and, with some qual-
ification, the divine mind are taken to be equally indispensable in the ac-
count of realiter possible objects.
IV
Of course, in a sense, accounting for being in terms of possibilia and pos-
sibilia in turn in terms of the cognizable (or, in the case of Kant maybe
even more accurately, cognizable by means of an intuitive cognition)
may very well be an odd position, but if the approach chosen is viable,
the oddity is first and foremost due to Kant’s allegiance to a tradition dif-
ferent from ours. Again, the Bach analogy might help at this point: ini-
tially Baroque music performed on period instruments sounded unfami-
liar, even wrong or downright ugly when measured against the aesthetic
20 Vd., for example, Gnostologia, 5.
21 Honnefelder: Duns Scotus, 140–142.
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norms of subsequent eras and it took a considerable amount of time to
familiarize the public with this different conceptual scheme of musical ex-
pression. In this vein, I take it that one important way to approach Kant’s
philosophy is to display it in its unfamiliarity first and then to see what to
make of it, instead of attempting to smoothen it into familiarity from the
very beginning. The question is of course what to do with this oddity
from the point of view of the historian of philosophy and the systematic
philosopher. It may very well be that Kant was somehow taking the as-
sumption for granted that a realiter possible entity must be something
(intuitively) cognizable for some cognizing subject, and that he did not
question it any further, in which case we may really just have a clash of
traditions. This at least explains the persistence of the interpretative prob-
lem we have with these Kantian doctrines as far as a balancing out of their
realist and idealist components are concerned. Taken in the Scotist way, it
is plausible to assume the existence of a causally active extra-mental object
and still be a transcendental idealist in that certain properties of this extra-
mental entity are picked up and in this sense made possible through the
human faculty of intuition. The divine intellect, by contrast, does not see
the spatial world spatially, as it were.
At any rate, Kant is improving this line of thought in at least one im-
portant respect: he clearly does away with the nave assumption of a noet-
ic-noematic parallelism which may be said to have reached its peak in
Wolff ’s mentalistic account of metaphysics. Rather, his point seems to
be to provide criteria for determining when we are allowed to assume
such a parallelism. In the case of the primaria, these criteria have to do
with the applicability of mathematics, in particular geometry, which
Kant claims to have established precisely in the passages preceding the
three Anmerkungen.22 Although this is far beyond the scope of this
paper, I should like to mention that in my view the direction of the re-
spective argument is different from what it is usually taken to be, in that
the demonstrability of geometrical properties by using concrete figures
both reveals the presence of a capacity of pure intuition and secures
the applicability of mathematics to empirical objects in one go, as it were.
Kant’s take on the noetic-noematic parallelism in my view indicates a
not insignificant advantage of the problem-historical approach just devel-
oped: Assuming that he retains the formal/objective distinction, one can
explain why Kant on the one hand endorses the secondary quality anal-
22 Cf. in particular Anmerkung III and the general context of Anmerkung II, i. e.
“how is mathematics possible?”
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ogy and on the other had warned against it. Both secondary and primary
qualities manifest themselves in the representation taken in the formal
sense, but whereas the primary qualities are an objective feature of the ap-
pearance, secondary qualities are not. Read this way, Kant’s claim of the
adequacy of our spatial intuition with regard to the relation of the object
to our sensibility in combination of a denial of a total similarity to the
object can be understood to mean that it is the mind-external object
which has spatial properties, that the formal representation is accurate
in this respect and that these spatial properties do not belong to the
in-itself-features of the composite whole the object is part of. Thus, sub-
ject dependency does not indicate that the mind contributes something to
the feature of an object; rather it indicates that the subject provides the
mind-external realm within which very special possibilia can be located,
namely objects of possible experience, for which the divine mind cannot
make room.
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